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Abstract A large extent of undetected norm violations may have positive effects for
society. If many norm violations are hidden, society seems to be in good order so that
actors are more willing to comply with the norms themselves. In this sense, igno-
rance promotes norm compliance. We challenge this view by arguing that in scenar-
ios, in which norms are controlled and enforced by third parties who receive rewards
for their success, the opposite is true: Ignorance promotes norm violations. The rea-
son is that unsuspicious inspectors who believe that little hidden norm violations are
committed will spend less effort for detection, some formerly detected norm viola-
tions will go undetected, norm targets will be less deterred from the lower detection
probability and will commit more norm violations over time. This article develops a
respective mathematical model and confirms the above described intuition.
Keywords Social norms · Dark figure · Self-fulfilling prophecy · Crime · Control ·
Punishment
1 Introduction
Imagine, everybody would be detected for every deviant act, for every peccadillo,
for every foolish lapse. While most of us probably like to know about the slips and
misconduct of our fellow men, we prefer to keep our own secrecies better for us so
that a dark field of norm violations prevails. Individually, it may be tempting to be in
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the position to know every indecency; however, it is open to research to which extent
societies should try to uncover every norm violation.
This detection problem is crucial in the context of many norm violations like tax
evasion, doping in sports or fare dodging. Further, its importance is increasing due
to the increasing establishment of high tech control technologies in modern societies
such as CCTV video systems, medical detection methods for drug use in professional
sports, detection technologies for weapons at airports, electronic finger prints or data
mining methods to trace criminals. Although there have been debates in social phi-
losophy about such changes towards a “control society” in modernity (cf. Foucault
1977; Cohen 1985; Garland 2001; Hudson 2002), the theoretical understanding of
the underlying mechanisms is still weak.
1.1 Why ignorance can promote norm compliance
While the missing knowledge of the actual extent of norm violations may appear as a
nuisance at first sight, it can have positive effects for society. Popitz (1968) published
a meanwhile classical essay on this argument by pointing out that ignorance may lead
to norm compliance. If norm violations are hidden, society seems to be in good order
and actors are willing to adhere to these norms as well. Loosely based on the saying
“what the eye does not see, the heart does not grieve over”, the dark field of norm
violations has a preventive effect.
The early conjecture of Popitz (1968) has been analyzed in more detail in the lit-
erature on herding behavior in social groups. This literature analyzes how actors may
draw wrong conclusions from public behavior to the unknown extent of this behavior
in private and the respective beliefs behind. Such misperceptions may set off dynam-
ics between public behaviors and private beliefs such that a large unknown extent of
norm violations discourages actors to violate the social norm themselves. The herding
literature in economics primarily analyzes informational cascades (Banerjee 1992;
Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Here, widespread uncertainty leads people to follow others
due to the false assumption that these others have more accurate information. Social
psychologists primarily studied pluralistic ignorance, which explains herding behav-
ior by the agents’ false assumption that most others will approve of what the majority
publicly complies with.1 In simpler words, informational cascades describe the false
assumption that everybody knows, pluralistic ignorance, that everybody believes.
Follow-up work analyzed the combination of herding with punishment. Punish-
ment can even provoke dynamics which result in wide-spread normative compliance
with largely unpopular norms (Bicchieri and Fukui 1999). A large potential of un-
known, private norm violations can urge individuals to signal their sincerity by pun-
ishing others. This punishment may, however, pressure many individuals to comply
and even to enforce such social norms which they privately disapprove. Centola et
al. (2005) specified this idea in an agent based model and Willer et al. (2009) tested
it experimentally. More specifically, the idea conceptualizes punishment as a signal
of sincerity of “posers” who privately oppose but publicly comply with the norm.
1See Allport (1924), Miller and McFarland (1987) and O’Gorman (1986) for a discussion of the theoretical
arguments and Kitts (2003) and Miller and Morrison (2009) for empirical studies.
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Their punishment can signal their credibility and trustworthiness as a true believer;
however, it pressures others to comply with the norm as well. As a consequence, the
punishment mechanism can amplify the above described herding dynamics. While a
large extent of unknown norm violations may reinforce norm compliance, the addi-
tional effects of punishment may even reinforce norm compliance of largely unpop-
ular norms.2
1.2 Why ignorance can promote norm violations
While the described literature above confirms the notion that ignorance promotes
norm compliance, we challenge this view. The underlying mechanism of the pre-
vious literature on herding implies that agents’ misperception of the actual extent
of norm violations spreads in their social group and affects others’ norm compliance.
Our research question, however, raises the issue as to whether these dynamics change
for groups with competing interests. If two groups have opposing incentives, social
influence among both groups may neutralize each other. We think of professional-
ized norm control personnel like police-men, conductors, guards, nichtwatchmen or
doping testers. Such inspectors have incentives to perform successful controls while
the norm targets have the competing incentive to commit successful norm violations.
Our claim that the results will change for competing groups is based on game theoret-
ical reasoning on zero-sum games. We know from theoretical (Tsebelis 1989, 1990)
and empirical analyses (Rauhut 2009a, 2009b) of inspection games that punishment
effects become inverted if there is competition between norm targets and inspectors.3
Our proposed model, therefore, analyzes situations in which norm targets and in-
spectors have competing interests and form beliefs about the unknown extent of norm
violations. Both parties apply these beliefs to meet their decisions to commit a norm
violation or to perform inspections. The dynamics consist of the following repulsive
forces: On the one hand, if norm targets believe in normative compliance of other
norm targets, this may reinforce their normative behavior. On the other hand, if in-
spectors believe likewise in norm compliance of norm targets, they will reduce their
inspection activities. This, however, may reduce the detection probability of norm
targets and, in turn, result in increasing norm violations over time. In the reversed
case, if norm targets belief in a large extent of hidden norm violations, they may be-
come infected to commit more norm violations themselves, which, however, incites
inspectors to inspect more extensively, finally resulting in less norm violations over
time. Thus, we expect predator-prey like dynamics, as Rauhut and Junker (2009) have
demonstrated for simpler inspection scenarios between norm targets and inspectors.
Our aim is to predict the resulting stable states of these dynamics in society: Does
the belief in others’ norm compliance reinforce normative behavior (self-fulfilling
prophecy) or does it even result in less normative behavior (inverse self-fulfilling
prophecy)?
2For a related simulation model of the emergence of unpopular norms see (Kitts 2006, 2008).
3For analyses of combined scenarios of centralized (formal) and decentralized (informal) social control of
norm violations see Bendor and Mookherjee (1987); Kitts (2006).
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1.3 Intuitive description of our model and main results
The remainder of the article and our main results are as follows. In a first step, we de-
velop a mathematical framework for modeling the interactions between norm targets
and inspectors. We assume that norm targets can decide to commit a norm violation
or not. If they decide to violate the norm, they can spend more or less effort to con-
ceal their norm violation from the inspector. The inspector, on the other hand, can
spend more or less effort to reveal the norm violations of the norm targets. If a norm
violation of a norm target is detected, the norm target receives a punishment while
the inspector a reward.
Our first analysis describes the simplified situation that norm targets and inspec-
tors know the actual extent of norm violations. The comparative statics of the model
return results which are intuitive and therefore confirm the plausibility of our gen-
eral model: Higher benefits for norm violations increase the rate of norm violations
and its detection rate. In contrast, higher benefits for successful detections and higher
punishments decreases the rate of norm violations.
Our second analysis extends the model to analyze the core research question of
how ignorance in the sense of unknown norm violations affect inspections and norm
violations. We differentiate between the detected and the overall rate of norm viola-
tions, while the overall rate consists of the detected and the undetected rate of norm
violations. Our key parameter is λ, which is the constant suspiciousness of the agents,
describing whether they believe that there is a small or large extent of undetected
norm violations in the population. The smallest level of suspiciousness would be that
agents believe that the detected rate of norm violations is similar to the overall rate
of norm violations. The largest level of suspiciousness describes the agents’ belief
that all norm targets commit a norm violation although only some of them have been
detected. Thus, our model specifies the belief λ of the agents in the range between
the rate of detected and the total number of possible norm violations. We find that
a higher suspiciousness of inspectors always decreases the overall rate of norm vio-
lations. Further, in most cases a higher suspiciousness of norm targets decreases the
overall rate of norm violations as well. We conclude that the belief that many others
commit hidden norm violations will decrease the actual rate of norm violations in the
population. The reason is that suspicious inspectors will spend more effort to detect
norm violations, formerly hidden norm violations will be detected and norm targets
will be deterred to commit norm violations over time.
Our analysis suggests that it depends on the enforcement mechanism in the group
whether ignorance promotes norm compliance. If the norms are enforced by group
members themselves, ignorance seems to promote norm compliance; however, if the
norms are enforced by third parties who receive rewards for their success, ignorance
promotes norm violations.
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2 The model
In our model, the population consists of n norm targets (agents) and one inspection
institution, called the inspector.4 We assume that at each time step t , a norm target’s
strategy xi(t) = (di(t), eai (t)) consists of two components: First there is a binary
choice between violating the norm (di = 1), and adhering to the norm (di = 0). We
refer to di as the behavior of norm target i. Second, eai ∈ [0,∞) captures the norm
target’s expenditures on concealing her fraud. Here, a rational individual’s choice of
adhering to the norm implies no expenditures on concealing the norm violation, i.e.
eai = 0 if di = 0. The inspector has no option to refrain from inspection. Hence, her
strategy is restricted to her expenditures on control effort ec(t) ∈ [0,∞). An increase
of control effort could reflect a larger sample of inspected norm targets or more so-
phisticated controls. In our model we assume that detection of norm violation is nei-
ther guaranteed nor occurs with a fixed probability. Instead, the detection probability
depends on the interaction between the norm targets and the inspector: For a norm
violator i (di(t) = 1), the probability of being detected by the inspector at time t is
pi
(
eai (t), ec(t), q(t)
) (1)
where q(t) = 1
n
∑
i di(t) denotes the proportion of norm violators among the norm
targets. Hence, the detection probability depends on the strategy of both parties: It
varies with the norm target’s concealment effort and the inspector’s detection effort.
In addition, the detection probability may also depend on the overall strength of the
norm captured by how many norm targets adhere to it, for example in the case of
indirect detections. By this we mean that in addition to a direct detection of norm
target i’s norm violation, it is also possible to discover indirectly the norm violation
by the detection of a distinct norm target j . The reason is that i and j might have a
common supplier of instruments for norm violation or concealment, e.g. a common
provider of drugs in case of doping or respective accounts for illegal earnings at a
common bank.5
For norm target i, the expected utility of a strategy xi = (di, eai ) is defined by
ua(xi) = di
(
ba − sp(eai , ec, q) − eai − ci
) − rbaq (2)
for fixed control effort ec and fixed proportion of norm violators q . Here, ba > 0
denotes the benefit of norm violation if the norm target is not detected. Norm violation
imposes a disadvantage on all norm targets numbered by rbaq whereas the factor
r ≥ 1 measures the extent of welfare loss for the population caused by norm violation
and corresponds to the multiplier for public contributions in the standard public goods
game. Thus, the only Nash equilibrium is the state where all norm targets violate the
norm. As norm violation decreases welfare, this is a dilemma scenario and there is a
4Although we consider one singular inspection institution, it may consist of several inspectors. All inspec-
tions actions refer to the whole corporate actor, i.e. the inspection institution.
5An example are the occurrences in the run-up to the Tour de France in 2006 where many cyclists were
suspended after a physician was accused by the police of conducting autologous blood transfusions.
6 P. Groeber, H. Rauhut
demand to enforce the norm.6 s > 0 is the punishment imposed on a norm violator
when her fraud is detected.
Additional to the expenditures ea for the concealment effort, a norm violator i
receives a disutility ci > 0 which can be interpreted as moral costs. This disutility is
randomly assigned to each norm target according to a distribution function F and is
therefore not explained by the model. ci reflects norm target i’s initial adherence to
the norm and does not change over time. It captures the extent to which the benefit
of norm violation has to exceed the expenditures on concealment and the expected
sanction cost if norm violation is detected for norm target i. For example, some ath-
letes know that doping would pay off but have internalized the anti-doping norm to an
extent that makes them refrain from drug use. Similarly, there are taxpayers who do
honestly report their income despite considerable economic incentives for norm vio-
lation (Andreoni et al. 1998, p. 822). Note that by these assumptions, an increase in
opportunity costs for adhering to the norm (e.g. by reduced control effort leading to a
decrease of detection probability for all norm targets) leads to an increase of norm vi-
olation in the population. Therefore, the norm targets’ behavior is in accordance with
the low-cost hypothesis (cf. North 1986; Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003; Rauhut
and Krumpal 2008) which postulates that the congruence of the acceptance of a social
norm with the corresponding normative behavior decreases with increasing costs.
In our model, the inspector’s strategy only consists of the control effort ec. We
assume that she gets a reward for each detected norm violator which constitutes an
incentive for wide controls. Nevertheless, high expenditures on control effort will
only pay off if the proportion of detected norm violators is sufficiently high so that
the inspector’s utility also depends on the actual proportion of norm violators. Hence,
for fixed concealment efforts eai and a proportion of norm violators q , the inspector’s







p(eai , ec, q)
)
− ec. (3)
Hence, the inspector’s reward is proportional to the expected proportion of detected





p(eai , ec, q). (4)
The reward for a detected norm violator is therefore bc
n
. We can interpret uc as the
variable part of the inspector’s income whereas the fixed part does not influence the
control effort. In case that all norm targets violate the norm and are detected, the
inspector achieves the maximum reward bc > 0. As uc(0) ≥ 0, i.e. zero control effort
always implies non-negative utility for the inspector, we obtain uc(e∗c ) ≥ 0 for the
utility maximizing effort e∗c . Hence, the inspector’s expenditures on control effort
6One might claim that norm violation can also lead to a welfare increase for the norm targets (e.g. induced
by r < 1). With respect to doping, extraordinary achievements enhanced by drug use might lead to an
increase of the aggregated income of all athletes by additional advertising revenue.
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will not exceed the expected reward q˜ bc if she maximizes her expected utility. This
can be interpreted as an implicit budget constraint for the inspector.
With respect to the norm targets’ and the inspector’s knowledge, we make the
following assumptions:
(K1) The utility functions ua of a norm target and uc of the inspector and the pa-
rameters ba (benefit of norm violation), s (sanction cost) and bc (benefit of
detection) are common knowledge.
(K2) The moral costs ci of norm violation are private information of norm target i.
Further, neither any norm target nor the inspector know the distribution function
F of these costs.
(K3) The proportion q˜(t) of detected norm violators at time t is common knowledge
at time t + 1.
(K4) The proportion q(t) of norm violators at time t cannot be observed by any
norm target or the inspector at time t + 1 (or any other timestep).
(K5) The are no false-positive detections of norm violators by the inspector.
We assume that norm targets and the inspector maximize their respective utility
given the above knowledge constraints. All strategies, i.e. each norm target’s behavior
and concealment effort on one hand and inspector’s control effort on the other, are
chosen simultaneously at all time steps and cannot be observed afterwards. Due to
our assumptions, the interaction between the norm targets and the inspector is partly
strategic. For example, the norm targets know that the inspector’s benefit increases
with the proportion of detected norm violators and account for this knowledge in
their decision-making. On the other hand, the inspector and other norm targets are
not able to foresee whether norm target i violates the norm or not for given strategies
of the other norm targets and the inspector as ci is unknown. Further, a prediction of
norm violation is not only impossible on the individual level—also the overall extent
of fraud captured by the proportion q of norm violators in the population cannot
be foreseen by the norm targets and the inspector as they do not know F . But as
the inspector’s benefit and possibly also the detection probability depend on q , we
assume that both parties have to estimate the proportion of norm violators q(t) at
time t and use it within their decision-making process at the next time step. We denote
these estimations by qˆai (t) (norm targets) and qˆc(t) (inspector).
If the distribution function F of the moral costs was common knowledge, we could
formulate our model as a Bayesian game whereas F represents the norm targets’
and the inspectors prior beliefs about each norm target’s moral cost ci . According to
Harsanyi (1967–1968), we could reformulate this game of incomplete information as
a game of imperfect information and apply standard equilibrium concepts (see Fuden-
berg and Tirole 1991, Chap. 8). However, as we cannot identify specific prior beliefs
in tax evasion or doping, we argue that our behavioral approach is more suitable to
model the norm targets’ and the inspector’s decision-making. Further, our results do
not depend on the actual shape of F .
The estimations of the real proportion of norm violators, which are then plugged
in the utility functions to determine the resulting optimal decisions, are based on the
proportion of detected norm violators q˜(t) at time t that is common knowledge by
(K3). This degree of information resembles real world examples: Although nobody
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knows the extent of tax evasion or doping in the population, actors will have vague
or intuitive beliefs resulting from common knowledge about how many taxpayers
or athletes have been detected as norm violators in a certain period.7 Note that as
we excluded false positive detections by (K5), a high proportion of detected norm
violators q˜ induces more information about the real proportion of norm violators q
compared to a low proportion q˜ . The reason is that a low value of q˜ might on the
one hand result from a low value of q . On the other hand, we may observe the same
proportion of detected norm violators if there is a high proportion of norm violators
paired with a low detection probability which can result from a high concealment
effort or a low inspection effort. As q˜ is only a lower bound for q , all estimations
qˆai (t), qˆc(t) have to fulfill
q˜(t) ≤ qˆa(t), qˆc(t) ≤ 1. (5)
In general, an actual estimation by the norm targets or the inspector might depend on
many factors. In Sect. 3.2 we specify a simple estimation procedure that combines
objective information (q˜) with an individual’s (external) subjective belief about the
extent of norm violation in the population.
Overall, we developed a model to analyze how the dark figure of norm violation
influences the interaction between the norm targets and the inspector assuming that
norm violation is only detected with a certain probability depending on the two par-
ties’ respective effort. Both parties act partly strategically in the sense of knowing
and considering the incentives of all involved individuals. However, they are only
boundedly rational as certain parameters of their utility function are unobservable
(the proportion of norm violators q) or private information (the moral cost ci ). In
the following section, we specify further assumptions on the probability of detec-
tion ((P1)–(P7)) and the estimation procedure ((E1)–(E4)) and analyze the resulting
dynamics. First, we investigate a scenario where the proportion of norm violators
is observable at any time step. In Sect. 3.2 we analyze how the dynamics change if
there is a dark field of norm violators, i.e. the proportion of norm violators is not
observable.
3 Analysis
We model the interaction between the norm targets and the inspector as follows: At
each time step, every norm target i chooses a strategy xi(t) = (di(t), eai (t)) where
eai denotes the concealment effort and di indicates whether norm violation pays off
(di = 1) or not (di = 0). Simultaneously, the inspector chooses the control effort
ec(t). Both parties maximize their respective expected utility according to (2) and (3)
7One may make the objection that detected deviance is not common knowledge (i.e. I know that you
know that I know that you know the observed level of deviance in the previous discrete time step). While
objective statistics may indeed exist for the level of doping or tax fraud in the real world, it may be
practically hard to access this information and to remember it correctly. We argue that this simplified
assumption is helpful, because the average belief of the rate of detected deviance may still resemble the
actual rate with some random noise around.
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Table 1 All parameters in the model. The first two sections describe the norm targets’ payoff for violating
and the inspector’s payoff for inspecting the social norm. The third section describes the parameters refer-
ring to the detection problem. Some of these variables are introduced later in the text. The key variable is λ,
which is a constant personality variable describing the belief of the extent of undetected norm violations.
It describes whether the agents believe in a low extent of undetected norm violations (close to q¯) or in a
large extent of undetected norm violations (close to 1, meaning all norm targets violate the norm). The
last section refers to Example 1 and summarizes the parameters of the exemplary functional form of the
detection probability
Norm targets
d behavior (0 = norm adherence, 1 = norm violation)
ba benefit from norm violation
ea effort to conceal norm violation
s punishment for norm violation
c moral cost for norm violation
F distribution of moral cost in population
r welfare loss due to norm violations
ua expected utility of norm targets
Inspector
bc benefit from successful detection
ec effort to detect norm violation
uc expected utility of inspector
Detection probability and unknown extent of norm violation
p detection probability of norm violation
α baseline detection probability (zero efforts of norm targets and inspectors)
q all norm violations
q¯ detected norm violations
λa norm target’s suspiciousness (constant belief of extent of undetected norm violations)
λc inspector’s suspiciousness (constant belief of extent of undetected norm violations)
qˆa norm target’s updated estimate of undetected norm violations
qˆc inspector’s updated estimate of undetected norm violations
Parameters of functional form of detection probability p in Example 1
β measures how concealment and inspection effort affect detection probability
γ measures how the extent of norm violations affects detection probability
on the basis of the observed consequences of their actions in the last period, namely
the proportion of norm violators or detected norm violators. Within one time step,
we assume strategic interaction between the norm targets and the inspector: Both
parties have knowledge of each others utility function and can incorporate it in their
respective optimization. Nevertheless, we restrict their strategic horizon to the actual
time step by (K2): The norm targets and the inspector do not take possible actions
in future periods into account as neither party has knowledge about the moral cost
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distribution F (and therewith the actual proportion of norm violators)—a norm target
i only knows her own value ci .
We now specify further assumptions with respect to the shape of the detection
probability function p. First, we require that for every norm target, the marginal
probability ∂p
∂ea
of being detected with respect to her effort ea does not depend on
the inspector’s expenditures ec and vice versa. This leads to
(P1) p(ea, ec, q) = (1 − α)fc(ec, q) − αfa(ea, q) + α
with fa,fc : R+ × [0,1] → [0,1] denoting the effect of the respective effort on the
probability of catching a norm violator. The parameter α = p(0,0, q) measures the
probability of being detected when both parties’ effort is zero. Hence, a low value
of α leads to an initial advantage for the norm violators as the revelation probability
is low in this situation. However, the marginal effect of every norm target’s effort is
decreased by a low value of α so that her initial advantage disappears with increasing
efforts. For the extreme example α = 0 (α = 1) detection is impossible (guaranteed)
for zero efforts of both parties, while any effort of the norm targets (the inspector)
has no effect. Considering the example of fare dodging, the probability of detecting
a passenger without a ticket is mainly affected by the inspector’s effort which in
this case represents the frequency of ticket examination. In contrast, the passenger’s
ability to conceal his fraud in case of inspection is very limited which overall is
reflected in α ≈ 0 in this situation.
Further, for i = a, c, fi has to fulfill the following requirements:
(P2) fi is continuous and twice continuously differentiable on its interior.
(P3) fi(·, q) is strictly concave for all q .
(P4) fi(0, q) = 0 for all q .
(P5) limei→0 ∂fi∂ei (ei , q) = ∞ for all q .
While (P2) is a purely technical assumption, (P3) guarantees that the detection
probability is strictly decreasing (strictly increasing) in the concealment (control) ef-
fort and that there is a decreasing marginal effect of both kinds of investments on the
revelation probability of norm violation.8 (P4) reflects that without any investments,
neither the inspector nor the norm targets can influence the probability p of catch-
ing a norm violator. Finally, (P5) assures that the marginal effect of investments is
infinitely high in case of zero expenditures. Hence, the inspector and a norm violator
will always exhibit non-zero investments. The assumptions (P2)–(P5) basically guar-
antee that there is always a unique optimal concealment and control effort for any
proportion of norm violators.
Additionally, we confine the dependence of the detection probability on the pro-











8Strict concavity, domain R+ and a non-negative codomain imply that fi is strictly increasing.
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By this assumptions, the effect and the marginal effect of expenditures on concealing
a norm violation are non-increasing with the proportion of norm violators q while the
effect and the marginal effect of inspection investments do not decrease with q .
Example 1 An example for a function p satisfying all the above assumptions is
p(ea, ec, q) = (1 − α)
[
1 − exp(−eβc
)] − α[1 − exp(−eβa
)]
(1 − γ q2) + α
with parameters β,γ ∈ (0,1).
Here, the effect of the effort expenditures ea and ec on the probability of detecting
a norm violator increases with β while γ determines the extent to which the effect
of the concealment effort depends on the proportion of norm violators q . In Fig. 1
we depict some properties of p for α = β = γ = 0.5. Note that we use this example
only to illustrate certain properties of our model—all following results hold for any
function p fulfilling the above assumptions and do not depend on the particular choice
of p.
Based on these assumptions, we now derive the dynamics for the key variable,
namely the proportion of norm targets in the population who do not adhere to the
norm.
3.1 Observable proportion of norm violators
First we analyze the model assuming that the proportion q of norm violators is ob-






e∗c (t + 1), q(t)
) = 1
(1 − α)bc (6)
whereas (P3)–(P5) guarantee its existence and uniqueness for all parameters. In the
following, e∗c (q(t)) denotes the inspector’s optimal effort at time t +1 for fixed α and
bc. Note that it also depends on q(t) if the detection probability is independent of the
proportion of norm violators.








whereas for all parameters, the optimum always exists and is unique as (P3)–(P5)
hold. As each norm target observes the same proportion of norm violators q(t), the
optimal concealment effort is identical for all norm targets. In the following, e∗a(q(t))
denotes a norm target’s optimal effort at time t + 1. Note that this optimal effort is
independent of q(t) in case the detection probability is independent of the proportion
of norm violators in the population. Additionally, the inspector’s decision influences
whether the norm target actually violates the norm or not. Norm target i will violate
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Fig. 1 The probability p(ea, ec, q) of being detected dependent on the concealment effort ea , the control
effort ec and the proportion of norm violators q for Example 1 with parameters α = β = γ = 0.5. In (a)
and (b), we depict p as a function of ea (or ec respectively). With q fixed, we choose different values of
ec (ea ) whereas the arrow indicates the direction of increase. In (c), we fix ea and ec and depict p as a
function of q where p(ea, ec, ·) decreases with ea and increases with ec . (d) shows p as a function of ea
and ec for q fixed
or equivalently
ci < ba − sp
(
e∗a(q(t)), e∗c (q(t)), q(t)
) − e∗a(q(t)). (8)
Here, the norm targets are able to determine the inspector’s optimal effort as q(t)
and the inspector’s utility are common knowledge. Note further that a norm target’s
decision whether to violate the norm or not does not depend on the factor r and is thus
not affected by the extent of welfare loss for the population caused by norm violation.
One can easily verify how the optimal efforts respond to a change in the proportion
q of norm violators (cf. Fig. 2):9
9All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
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Fig. 2 Illustration of Proposition 1. An increase in the proportion of norm violators from q1 to q2 leads
to a decrease of the optimal concealment effort e∗a and an increase of the optimal control effort e∗c
Proposition 1 For all ba, bc, s ∈ R+, α ∈ [0,1],
(i) e∗a(q) is non-increasing in q ,
(ii) e∗c (q) is strictly increasing in q
for any proportion of norm violators q ∈ [0,1].
As both parties know q(t), they can immediately determine their respective opti-
mal effort level. To check whether norm violation pays off, each norm target addi-
tionally can use her knowledge about the inspector’s utility to obtain e∗c (t) and thus
insert it in (8). Hence, the new proportion of norm violators
q(t + 1) = F (ba − sp
(
e∗a(q(t)), e∗c (q(t)), q(t)
) − e∗a(q(t))
) =: gq(q(t)) (9)
is completely determined by the respective proportion at the previous time step (see
Fig. 3). Any equilibrium proportion of norm violators q∗ thus is a fixed point of gq ,
i.e. q∗ = gq(q∗). Further, we denote the proportion of detected norm violators in
equilibrium by
q˜(q∗) = q∗p(e∗a(q∗), e∗c (q∗), q∗
)
.
We know how the iteration function gq responds to a change in the proportion of
norm violators:
Proposition 2 If F is differentiable in all except finitely many points, the propor-
tion of norm violators q(t + 1) at time t + 1 decreases with the proportion of norm
violators q(t) at time t .
Note that by allowing a finite number of points where F is not differentiable we
do not exclude for instance a uniform distribution on an interval. Further, the proof
shows that our assumptions (P6) and (P7) are necessary for the above proposition as
the effect of an increase of q(t) on the detection probability might be ambiguous if
one of these assumptions did not hold.
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Fig. 3 Dynamics for an observable proportion of norm violators. A plus (minus) sign indicates that an
increase of the respective input variable causes an increase (decrease) in the dependent variable whereas
the monotonicity is not strict. The dotted line pictures the multi-level relation between the proportion of
norm violators at time t and the proportion of norm violators at time t + 1
We now show that this equilibrium is unique for arbitrary parameters and derive
its comparative statics.
Theorem 1 If F is differentiable in all except finitely many points, gg has a unique
fixed point q∗(ba, s, bc,F ) which is
(i) increasing in ba ,
(ii) decreasing in s and bc
for all parameters ba, s, bc > 0. Further, the associated proportion of detected norm
violators q˜(q∗(ba, s, bc,F )) in equilibrium is increasing in ba .
Hence, the assumption of an observable proportion of norm violators leads to a
unique equilibrium q∗ which increases with the benefit of norm violation ba and
decreases with the sanction cost s for a detected norm violator and the inspector’s
maximum reward bc for detected norm violation. Note that this holds for all para-
meters and in particular for any distribution of moral costs. We can also predict that
the proportion of detected norm violators q˜∗ in equilibrium increases with ba as this
implies more norm violators and a higher detection probability. In contrast, the effect
of an increase of s or bc on q˜∗ is ambiguous: The proportion of norm violators is
reduced in both cases, but the increased quality of inspections counteracts this effect
and prohibits any general prediction.
For a finite number of norm targets, the assumption of a continuous moral cost
distribution is obviously violated. Here, the equilibrium may not be reached as the
fraction of drug users is always rational in this situation. Nevertheless, one can inter-
pret the equilibrium q∗ as the expected proportion of norm violators when the moral
cost value ci of each norm target i is randomly drawn from a continuous distribution
function F fulfilling the assumptions of Theorem 1.
The equilibrium is not necessarily stable, i.e. for an initial proportion of norm
violators which is different from q∗ convergence is not guaranteed. For Example 1,
dependent on the parameters one can also observe alternating proportions of norm
violators. In Fig. 4, we compare two scenarios whereas the parameters only differ
in the punishment s for detected norm violators. For a low value of s, we observe
convergence towards the equilibrium proportion of norm violators q∗. An increase of
s leads to destabilization as q alternates between zero and a positive value. Here, there
is initially no incentive for controls as all norm targets adhere to the norm. The norm
targets anticipate this behavior, and norm violation pays off for a non-zero proportion
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Fig. 4 Dynamics of the proportion of norm violators q , the proportion of detected norm violators q˜ and
the concealment/control effort ea /ec for Example 1 (including cobweb diagram for q) with ba = bc = 20,
ci uniformly distributed on [0, ba ] and α = 0.2, β = 0.8, γ = 0.5 whereas initially all norm targets are
norm adherent. In (a), the equilibrium is stable, while an increase in the punishment s for detected norm
violators leads to a destabilization of the fixed point in (b). Note that the optimal concealment effort can
be positive although all norm targets adhere to the norm
of the population. At the next time step, this can be observed by the inspector who
therefore increases the control effort. Due to the high punishment of norm violation,
this is sufficient to make all norm targets refrain from norm violation and we will
hence observe oscillating behavior instead of convergence towards the equilibrium.
As we did in general not specify the function of probability of detection p in
detail, we cannot determine specific ranges within the parameter space that yield a
stable equilibrium for arbitrary p. Nevertheless, the proof of Proposition 2 shows that
|g′q(q)| increases with s and decreases with bc.10 Thus, increasing punishment for
detected norm violators destabilizes the system whereas an increase of the inspectors
benefits leads to the opposite effect.11
3.2 The dark figure of norm violation
So far we assumed that at any time step, the norm targets and the inspector know the
actual proportion of norm violators q and therefore are able to determine their optimal
10Cf. (A.1).
11For any fixed point q∗ of gq , |g′q (q∗)| < 1 implies stability.
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decisions based on that value. In many situations this information is not available for
either party, e.g. in the context of tax fraud or doping in sports. In order to determine
their optimal effort at time t + 1 according to (7) and (6) respectively, they need to
estimate q(t) based on the public information of the proportion of detected norm
violators q˜(t) in the previous period. Any estimation has to be consistent with that
information: If the proportion of detected norm violators at time t is q˜(t), a norm
targets’ estimation qˆai (t) and the inspector’s estimation qˆc(t) of the real proportion
of norm violators q(t) at that time naturally have to fulfill (5) as this always holds for
the estimated value q in absence of false-positive detections.
The norm targets and the inspector now have to choose a feasible estimation of q
according to (5). We assume that this choice is determined by the moral confidence,
i.e. the belief of the extent of norm compliance in the population. In our model, a
norm target’s moral confidence is measured by the suspiciousness λai ∈ [0,1] which
denotes the antonym (i.e. the belief of the extent of norm violation). The inspector’s
suspiciousness towards the extent of norm violation is measured by the parameter
λc ∈ [0,1]. Note that these parameters are exogenous and not explained by our model.
Additional requirements to the estimation procedure are the following:
(E1) A norm target’s (or the inspector’s) estimation qˆai (t) (qˆc(t)) of the real propor-
tion of norm violators is increasing in the proportion of detected norm violators
q˜(t) for any given suspiciousness λai (λc) at any timestep t .
(E2) A norm target’s (or the inspector’s) estimation qˆai (t) (qˆc(t)) of the real propor-
tion of norm violators is increasing in the suspiciousness λai (λc) for any given
proportion of detected norm violators q˜(t) at any timestep t .
(E3) The suspiciousness of a norm target (of the inspector) is private information and
does not change over time.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the estimation of the real proportion of
norm violators is an affine-linear function of the suspiciousness and the proportion of
detected norm violators respectively:12
qˆj (t) = q˜(t) + λj (1 − q˜(t)), j = ai, c. (10)
For λai = 0 (λai = 1), norm target i assumes the minimum (maximum) control level,
i.e. qˆai = 1 (qˆai = q˜). For λai = 0.5, the norm target’s estimation is the arithmetic
mean of the extreme values (analogously for λc). λai (λc) is also the estimated pro-
portion of norm violators of a norm target (the inspector) if no norm violators are de-
tected. Hence, the norm targets and the inspector combine private beliefs (which are
exogenous and constant) and public information (which is explained by the model) to
estimate the proportion of norm violators. By (E3), we bound the norm targets’ and
the inspector’s rationality as any individual (norm target or inspector) is only aware
of her own suspiciousness and therefore cannot foresee other individuals’ estimations
of the proportion of norm violators q . Instead we assume that she plugs in her own
estimation in case the decision-making requires another individual’s estimation of q
12Without changing the results one could also assume any function z : [0,1] × [0,1] → [q˜,1] that is
increasing in both arguments to locate the estimation qˆ = z(q˜, λ) of q in a more general way.
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Fig. 5 Dynamics of the proportion of detected norm violators q˜ , the proportion of norm violators q and
the estimated proportion of norm violators qˆa and qˆc if the proportion of norm violators is unobservable for
Example 1 (including cobweb diagram for q˜) with λa = 0.05, λc = 0.3, ba = bc = s = 20, ci uniformly
distributed on [0, ba ] and α = 0.2, β = 0.8, γ = 0.5 whereas initially all norm targets are norm adherent
(e.g. a norm targets has to consider the inspector’s incentives which depends on the
proportion of norm violators). Additionally and similar to assumption, we require
that the suspiciousness is homogeneous among the norm targets:
(E4) The suspiciousness of all norm targets is identical, i.e. λai = λa .
Hence, all estimations of the real proportion of norm violators by the norm targets
are identical, i.e. qˆai = qˆa .
With these assumptions, the dynamics of our model in case of an unobservable
proportion of norm violators can now be rewritten in terms of the proportion of de-
tected norm violators q˜ . With q˜(t) denoting this proportion at time t , we obtain
q˜(t + 1) = q(t + 1)p(e∗a(qˆa(t)), e∗c (qˆc(t)), q(t + 1)
) =: gq˜(q˜(t);λa,λc) (11)
where qˆa(t) = qˆa(q˜(t)) and qˆc(t) = qˆc(q˜(t)) depend on q˜(t), λa , λc via (5) and (10)
and q(t + 1) = gq(qˆa(t)). Note that a fixed point q˜∗ of gq˜ induces an equilibrium
proportion of norm violators that we denote by q∗(q˜∗). Figure 5 depicts the dynamics
according to (11) for Example 1.
Further, we can specify how the iteration function gq˜ depends on the parties’ re-
spective suspiciousness:
Proposition 3 For all q˜, λa, λc ∈ [0,1],
(i) gq˜(q˜, λa, λc) is increasing in λc ,
(ii) q(q˜) is decreasing in q˜
where q(q˜) denotes the proportion of norm violators resulting from a proportion q˜ of
detected norm violators.
After having introduced uncertainty by the unobservability of the proportion of
norm violators, the first question is whether Theorem 1 still holds for the new dy-
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Fig. 6 Example 1 with ba = s = 10, λa = λc = 0.01, ci uniformly distributed on [0, ba ] and α = 0.04,
β = 0.9, γ = 0.1. (a) pictures how the equilibrium proportion of norm violators change with the detection
reward bc for observable (left) and unobservable proportion of norm violators q(t). A plus indicates stable,
a circle unstable equilibria. In (b), we show the equilibrium proportions of detected norm violators (the
fixed points of gq˜ ) for unobservable q(t) and the iteration function gq˜ for bc = 2 (one fixed point), bc = 8
(three fixed points: two stable, one unstable) and bc = 20 (one fixed point)
namics, i.e. if there is always a unique equilibrium proportion of norm violators.13
The answer is no: In Fig. 6 we show that there are parameter settings where multiple
fixed points of gq˜ can arise in Example 1 when there is a dark figure of norm vio-
lation. In this example, the number of fixed points depends on the inspection reward
bc: for 0 < bc < b1c ≈ 6.4, there is a unique stable fixed point of gq˜ and therefore also
a unique stable equilibrium proportion of norm violators. For b1c < bc < b2c ≈ 12.2,
we observe two stable equilibria: one where approximately 96.
The reason is that gq˜ is not necessarily decreasing in q˜ (see Fig. 7): An increase
of q˜ will also increase the parties’ estimation qˆa and qˆc of the real proportion of
norm violators q (cf. (5), (10)). According to Proposition 1, this leads to an increase
13The Brouwer fixed point theorem guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
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Fig. 7 Dynamics for an unobservable proportion of norm violators. A plus (minus) sign indicates that an
increase of the respective input variable causes an increase (decrease) in the dependent variable whereas
the monotonicity is not strict. A question mark denotes that the effect of a change in the input variable
cannot be predicted in general. Multi-level relations as the response of the proportion of norm violators
to a change in the proportion of detected norm violators are pictures by a dotted line. The arrow label
indicates the origin of the respective relation
of e∗c , a decrease of e∗a and in addition to a decrease of the resulting proportion of
norm violators q as gq is decreasing (with argument qˆa). However, the probability
of being detected decreases in this situation. Hence, we obtain less norm violators
but also a lower probability of being detected. Consequently we cannot make general
predictions about the new proportion of detected violators.
Our basic research question is how estimation of the dark figure of norm deviance
influences the actual strength of a norm. Regarding our model, we can reformulate
this question: How does a change in the norm targets’ and the inspector’s estimation
procedure of the real proportion of norm violators, i.e. a change in λa or λc, influ-
ence the proportion of norm violators in equilibrium? As we only made very basic
assumptions about the dynamics by not specifying the dependence of the probabil-
ity of detecting norm violation on the parties’ respective effort and the proportion of
norm violators in detail, an all-encompassing answer is not possible. Nevertheless we
are able to make very general predictions in Theorem 2 about how a “typical” stable
equilibrium q˜∗ (i.e. q˜∗ is asymptotically stable and hyperbolic14) of detected norm
violators will respond to small changes in the suspiciousness parameters λa and λc
of the norm targets and the inspector. There, we make use of the following lemmas
referring to that type of fixed point.
Lemma 1 Let xt+1 = f (xt ) denote a difference equation with f : [0,1] → [0,1]
continuous. If x∗ is an asymptotically stable fixed point of f , there is δ > 0 with
(i) f (x) < x if x ∈ (x∗, x∗ + δ),
14See e.g. Elaydi (1996) for a definition of an asymptotically stable and hyperbolic equilibrium.
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(ii) f (x) > x if x ∈ (x∗ − δ, x∗).
Lemma 2 Let f : [0,1]× [0,1] → [0,1] be continuous and let xt+1 = fλ(xt ) denote
a difference equation with fλ := f (·, λ) continuously differentiable for all λ. If x∗(λ)
is an asymptotically stable hyperbolic fixed point of fλ, then for all δx > 0 there is
δλ > 0 so that for all λ′ ∈ [0,1] with |λ′ − λ| < δλ there is a unique fixed point x˜ of
fλ′ in [x∗ − δx, x∗ + δx], i.e.
|λ′ − λ| < δλ ⇒ ∃x˜ ∈ [x∗ − δx, x∗ + δx] with fλ′(x˜) = x˜ and |f ′λ′(x˜)| < 1.
Moreover, x˜ is asymptotically stable and hyperbolic.
If we observe convergence towards an equilibrium q˜∗, then this fixed point is typ-
ically asymptotically stable and hyperbolic. Nevertheless we cannot exclude possi-
ble exceptions such as semi-stable or asymptotically stable but non-hyperbolic equi-
libria (or starting in an unstable equilibrium). But for any given functional form of
p(ea, ec, q) it can easily be verified whether an equilibrium q˜∗ of gq˜ has the desig-
nated property.15
Theorem 2 Let q˜∗(λa, λc) denote an asymptotically stable hyperbolic fixed point of
gq˜ for suspiciousness parameters λa,λc ∈ [0,1] and let gq˜ be continuously differen-
tiable at q˜∗(λa, λc). Then there is δ > 0 with
q˜∗(λa, λ′c)
{≤ q˜∗(λa, λc) if λ′c ∈ [λc − δ,λc],
≥ q˜∗(λa, λc) if λ′c ∈ [λc,λc + δ],
whereas q˜∗(λa, λ′c) denotes the unique fixed point of gq˜ on [x∗ − δ, x∗ + δ] for sus-
piciousness parameters λa,λ′c .
This means that a small increase in the inspector’s suspiciousness λc leads to an in-
crease of the equilibrium proportion of detected norm violators q˜∗. The reason is that
the iteration function gq˜ increases with λc as for a given proportion of detected norm
violators, the inspector’s estimation of the proportion of norm violators increases with
λc (cf. Fig. 8(a)). By this shift of gq˜ , the equilibrium proportion of detected norm vio-
lators must increase.16 As the equilibrium proportion of norm violators q∗ decreases
with the norm targets’ estimation qˆ∗a which is positively affected by the increase of
q˜∗ (cf. Fig. 7), this will finally lead to a decrease of the proportion of norm violators
q∗ in the new equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Let q˜∗(λa, λc) denote an asymptotically stable hyperbolic fixed point of
gq˜ for suspiciousness parameters λa,λc ∈ [0,1] and let gq˜ be continuously differen-
tiable at q˜∗(λa, λc). Let further q∗(λa, λc) = q(q˜∗(λa, λc)) denote the proportion of
15|g′
q˜
(q˜∗)| < 1) is a sufficient condition.
16This conclusion is possible if the old equilibrium is asymptotically stable and hyperbolic and the change
in λc is sufficiently small.
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Fig. 8 Change in the norm targets’ and the inspector’s suspiciousness for Example 1 with ba = bc =
s = 10, ci uniformly distributed on [0, ba ] and α = β = 0.9, γ = 0.5. The left column pictures the iteration
function gq˜ , the right column the equilibrium proportion of norm violators q∗ and detected norm violators
q˜∗ depending on the respective suspiciousness. In (a) we increase the inspector’s suspiciousness λc from
0.1 to 0.9 while in (b) the norm targets’ suspiciousness λa is increased
norm violators in that equilibrium. Then there is δ > 0 with
q∗(λa, λ′c)
{≥ q∗(λa, λc) if λ′c ∈ [λc − δ,λc],
≤ q∗(λa, λc) if λ′c ∈ [λc,λc + δ],
whereas q˜∗(λa, λ′c) denotes the unique fixed point of gq˜ on [x∗ − δ, x∗ + δ] for sus-
piciousness parameters λa,λ′c .
Note that in general, we can only guarantee the existence of the threshold δ for
a change in the inspector’s suspiciousness where a prediction regarding the change
in the equilibrium proportion of norm violators is possible. Depending on the func-
tional form of p(ea, ec, q), the threshold could be arbitrarily small, whereas in other
scenarios this prediction is possible for any change in the inspectors suspiciousness.
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Further, Theorem 2 might not be valid in case of a more sophisticated estimation pro-
cedure of the proportion of norm violators by the norm targets and the inspector. For
example, both types of individuals could use their knowledge of their past actions or
their counterpart’s estimation procedure and thereby shorten the interval of feasible
estimations of the proportion of norm violators. One can show that this more sophis-
ticated procedure does not fulfill assumption (E1) for arbitrary detection probability
functions p.
Without further requirements on p it is not possible to deduce a similar result with
respect to a change in the norm targets’ suspiciousness λa : It is not clear whether
an increase of λa increases or decreases the equilibrium proportion of detected norm
violators q˜∗ (cf. Fig. 8). The reason is that the iteration function gq˜ is not decreasing
in λa . However, regarding the dependence of the equilibrium proportion of norm























Here, 1 − q˜∗(λa, λc) is non-negative and reflects the marginal effect of a change in
λa on the norm targets’ estimation qˆ∗a of the proportion of norm violators (with q˜∗
fixed) while the sign of ∂q˜∗
∂λa
(λa, λc) cannot be determined in general. Hence, q∗(λa)
increases with λa only if the change in q˜∗ is negative and overcompensates the in-
crease of qˆ∗ by λc . Thus, we expect that an increase in the norm targets’ suspicious-
ness causes a decrease of the proportion of norm violators in most cases.
Overall, we can predict that an increase in the norm targets’ or the inspector’s
suspiciousness usually leads to a decrease in the equilibrium proportion of norm vi-
olators in the population. We provide a precise definition of “usually” whereas the
definition with respect to a change in the inspector’s suspiciousness differs from that
with respect to a change in the norm targets’ suspiciousness.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated how the belief in others’ norm compliance affects own
normative behavior. Popitz (1968) argued that ignorance of others’ norm compliance
promotes normative behavior, because actors are more willing to adhere to social
norms if they believe others do so as well (self-fulfilling prophecy). We challenge
this view by considering strategic interaction between norm targets and inspectors.
If inspectors believe in a low extent of undetected norm violations, the detection
probability for norm violations decreases and norm violations will increase (inverse
self-fulfilling prophecy).
We consider the detection problem of norm violations in the context of public
goods dilemmas. As in the context of tax evasion or doping in sports, the extent of
norm violations is unknown to both the norm targets (e.g. taxpayers or athletes) and
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the inspectors. We model the interaction between norm targets and inspectors of a so-
cial norm. Our model links the belief of the extent of undetected norm violations with
the actual rate of norm violations and with inspection behavior. The norm targets and
the inspectors combine their respective (exogenous) belief of the undetected norm
violations on the one hand and public information about the proportion of detected
norm violators on the other. The agents use their beliefs and knowledge to estimate
the overall extent of detected and undetected norm violations in the population.
Our analysis suggests that Popitz’ (1968) intuitive reasoning that ignorance pro-
motes norm compliance does not hold in general. We can derive an “inverse” self-
fulfilling prophecy effect: An increase in the inspector’s belief in the norm targets’
compliance always decreases the actual overall proportion of norm compliance in
equilibrium. In addition, we typically observe that an increase in the norm targets’
belief of others’ compliance decreases the proportion of norm compliance in equilib-
rium. Our results can be understood with considering the competitive incentive struc-
ture of norm targets and inspectors. The inspectors lose incentives for control efforts
when there are (or they believe that there are) little undetected norm violations. Thus,
the effect of moral stabilization on the side of the norm targets is overcompensated
by the increased incentive for norm violations due to the low detection probability.
As a second result, we demonstrate that the dark field of norm violations can
induce multiple equilibria of committed norm violations. This result can be linked to
the recent debate that punishment operates dissimilar in different societies (Herrmann
et al. 2008), which may be due to distinct punishment cultures (Gintis 2008).
The interpretation of our results relates to recent developments in doping in sports.
While in the decades before approximately 1990, very few athletes were detected for
drug use, there is strong evidence that doping was performed area-wide in a number
of countries, in particular in the German Democratic Republic (Franke and Beren-
donk 1997). While the number of detected drug using athletes recently increased
(e.g. Brissonneau and Depiesse 2006, p. 164), the actual absolute and relative extent
of doping has probably decreased (e.g. Leonard 2001). Although an increased num-
ber of detections could be interpreted as a hint for more violations of the anti-doping
norm, the opposite may be true due to an increased effectiveness of controls. In the
context of our model, this development may be explained by an increase in the belief
of the number of undetected drug using athletes, possibly due to intensified media
reports on doping.
Prospective research could validate our theoretical results with empirical data. The
most promising method were laboratory experiments because of the measurement
problems of the dark field of undetected norm violations. In the field, data is usu-
ally only available for detected tax evasion, detected doping or detected crime in
general. Survey data on self-reports of norm violations, on the other hand, are typ-
ically unreliable because these behaviors are understated in surveys.17 In contrast,
undetected norm violations could be measured in the laboratory more precisely.18
As a baseline scenario, a public goods game could be used to measure detected and
17See Elffers et al. (1987) for an example with respect to a survey on tax evasion.
18For a related experiment on detection of norm violations see Rauhut (2009a, 2009b).
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undetected norm violations. One type of subjects (the norm targets) could either con-
tribute a fixed amount of money to a public good or violate the cooperation norm by
contributing nothing. If a norm violation is detected by inspectors (the other type of
subjects), the respective norm target would be punished. Norm violators could invest
in concealment to reduce their detection probability and inspectors could invest in the
quality of controls in order to receive rewards in case of success.
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as fa,fc are strictly concave and we required (P6) and (P7). 
Proof of Proposition 2 We have

















































and thus g′q(q) ≤ 0 if gq is differentiable at q by using Proposition 1, assumptions
(P6) and (P7), (7) and (6). Hence, gq is decreasing as it is continuous in the finitely
many points in which it is not differentiable. 
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Proof of Theorem 1 We have to show that gq has a unique fixed point. The Brouwer
fixed point theorem immediately guarantees the existence of a fixed point q∗. The
uniqueness of q∗ is ensured by the fact that gq is decreasing according to Proposi-
tion 2.
As gq is decreasing for all ba, s, bc , monotonicity of gq in one of this parame-
ters implies a corresponding monotonicity of q∗(ba, s, bl) in that parameter. One







≤ 0 (where F is differentiable) which proves the























where F is differentiable. 
Proof of Proposition 3 First, the norm targets’ estimation qˆa of the proportion of
norm violators does not depend on λc. Hence, we obtain
∂gq˜
∂λc
(q˜, λa, λc) = q(qˆa) ∂p
∂ec
(






(q˜, λc) ≥ 0
as p increases with e∗c , e∗c increases with qˆc (cf. Proposition 1(ii)) and
∂qˆc
∂λc
(q˜, λc) = (1 − q˜) ≥ 0.









≤ 0 according to Proposition 2. 
Proof of Lemma 1 If for all δ > 0 there is x ∈ (x∗, x∗ + δ) with f (x) = x, x∗ cannot
be attractive and thus not asymptotically stable. Hence let us assume that we always
find x with f (x) > x in the same interval. As f is continuous, this implies that there
is ε > 0 with
f (x) > x for x ∈ [x∗, x∗ + ε]. (A.2)
Then x∗ cannot be stable: for all δ′ > 0 (with δ′ < ε) we can choose x0 ∈ (x∗, x∗+δ′).
If we assume |xt − x∗| = xt − x∗ < ε for all t , (xt )t must converge with
x∗ < lim
t→∞xt ≤ ε.
But then the limit is a fixed point of f :
f ( lim
t→∞xt ) = limt→∞f (xt ) = limt→∞xt+1 = limt→∞xt
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as f is continuous. This is a contradiction to (A.2), hence we proved (i). The proof
for (ii) is analogous. 
Proof of Lemma 2 According to Lemma 1 and the fact that x∗ is an asymptotically
stable hyperbolic fixed point, we can find δ > 0 (δ ≤ δx ) with
fλ(x)
{
< x if x ∈ [x∗, x∗ + δ],
> x if x ∈ [x∗ − δ, x∗] (A.3)
and
|f ′λ(x)| < 1 for x ∈ I
whereas I := [x∗ − δ, x∗ + δ]. As fλ is continuous on the compact set I , we can
define




Further we can choose x−, x+ ∈ I with x− < x∗ and x+ > x∗ and define
ε2 := min(fλ(x−) − x−, x+ − fλ(x+)) > 0
according to (A.3). As ∂f
∂x
is uniformly continuous on the compact set I ×[0,1], there
is δ1 > 0 so that for (x1, λ1), (x2, λ2) ∈ I × [0,1]
‖(x1, λ1) − (x2, λ2)‖ < δ1 ⇒ |f ′λ1(x1) − f ′λ2(x2)| < ε1
holds whereas ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. In particular, we thereby obtain
|λ′ − λ| < δ1 ⇒ |f ′λ′(x) − f ′λ(x)| < ε1
for all x ∈ I and λ′ ∈ [0,1] as ‖(x,λ′) − (x,λ)‖ = |λ′ − λ|.
Further, the continuity of f (x, ·) for all x guarantees the existence of δ2 > 0 with
|λ′ − λ| < δ2 ⇒ |fλ′(x−) − fλ(x−)|, |fλ′(x+) − fλ(x+)| < ε2
for λ′ ∈ [0,1]. Overall, this implies
|λ′ − λ| < δλ ⇒ |f ′λ′(x)| < 1 for all x ∈ I,
fλ′(x−) − x− > 0, fλ′(x+) − x+ < 0
with δλ := min(δ1, δ2). Hence, according to the intermediate value theorem, we ob-
tain
|λ′ − λ| < δλ ⇒ ∃x˜ ∈ (x−, x+) with fλ′(x˜) = x˜ and |f ′λ′(x˜)| < 1,
i.e. for small variations of λ there is always an asymptotically stable hyperbolic fixed
point near the old equilibrium x∗. Moreover, as |f ′
λ′(x)| < 1 for |λ′ − λ| < δλ and
x ∈ I , we know that ∂
∂x
fλ′(x) − x < 0, i.e. x˜ is the only fixed point of fλ′ on I for
|λ′ − λ| < δλ. 
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Proof of Theorem 2 We define hλ′c (q˜) := gq˜(q˜, λa, λ′c) for λ′c ∈ [0,1]. Lemma 1 guar-
antees the existence of δq˜ > 0 with
hλc (q˜) − q˜
{
> 0 if q˜ ∈ [q˜∗(λa, λc) − δq˜ , q˜∗(λa, λc)),
< 0 if q˜ ∈ (q˜∗(λa, λc), q˜∗(λa, λc) + δq˜ ].
According to Lemma 2, there is further δλc > 0 so that for |λ′c − λc| < δλc there is a
unique fixed point of hλ′ in [q˜∗(λa, λc) − δq˜ , q˜∗(λa, λc) + δq˜ ] which we refer to as
q˜∗(λa, λ′c).
If λ′c ∈ [λc − δλc , λc], Proposition 3 implies that hλ′c (q) ≤ hλc(q˜) for q˜ ∈ [0,1],
which leads to
hλ′c (q˜) − q˜ ≤ hλc (q˜) − q˜ < 0 for q˜ ∈ (q∗(λa, λc), q∗(λa, λc) + δq˜ ].
Hence, there is no fixed point of hλ′c in that interval and we thereby obtain
q˜∗(λa, λ′c) ∈
[
q˜∗(λa, λc) − δq˜ , q˜∗(λa, λc)
]
.
Analogously one can show that
q˜∗(λa, λ′c) ∈
[
q˜∗(λa, λc), q˜∗(λa, λc) + δq˜
]
for λ′c ∈ [λc,λc + δλc ]. 















by using Proposition 2. 
References
Allport FH (1924) Social psychology. Houghton-Mifflin, Boston
Andreoni J, Erard B, Feinstein J (1998) Tax compliance. J Econ Lit 36(2):818–860
Banerjee AV (1992) A simple model of herd behavior. Q J Econ 107(3):797–817
Bendor J, Mookherjee D (1987) Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective action. Am Polit
Sci Rev 81(1):129–154
Bicchieri C, Fukui Y (1999) The great illusion: ignorance, informational cascades, and the persistence of
unpopular norms. Bus Ethics Q 9(1):127–155
Bikhchandani S, Hirshleifer D, Welch I (1992) A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural-change as
informational cascades. J Polit Econ 100(5):992–1026
Brissonneau C, Depiesse F (2006) Doping and doping control in French sport. In: Spitzer G (ed), Doping
and doping control in Europe. Meyer & Meyer Sport, Aachen, pp 145–167
Centola D, Willer R, Macy M (2005) The emperor’s dilemma: a computational model of self-enforcing
norms. Am J Soc 110(4):1009–1040
Cohen S (1985) Visions of social control: crime, punishment, and classification. Polity Press, Blackwell
Diekmann A, Preisendörfer P (2003) The behavioral effects of environmental attitudes in low-cost and
high-cost situations. Ration Soc 15(4):441–472
Elaydi SN (1996) An introduction to difference equations. Springer, New York
28 P. Groeber, H. Rauhut
Elffers H, Weigel RH, Hessing DJ (1987) The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax
evasion behavior. J Econ Psychol 8(3):311–337
Foucault M (1977) Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. Pantheon Books, New York
Franke W, Berendonk B (1997) Hormonal doping and androgenization of athletes: a secret program of the
German Democratic Republic government. Clin Chem 43(7):1262–1279
Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge
Garland D (2001) The culture of control: crime and social order in late modernity. Clarendon, Oxford
Gintis H (2008) Punishment and cooperation. Science 319(5868):1345–1346
Harsanyi JC (1967–1968) Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, parts I–III.
Manag Sci 14:159–182 320–334, 486–502
Herrmann B, Thoni C, Gächter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319(5868):1362–
1367
Hudson B (2002) Punishment and control. In: Maguire M, Morgan R, Reiner R (eds), The Oxford hand-
book of Criminology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 233–263
Kitts JA (2003) Egocentric bias or information management? Selective disclosure and the social roots of
norm misperception. Soc Psychol Q 66(3):222–237
Kitts JA (2006) Collective action, rival incentives, and the emergence of antisocial norms. Am Soc Rev
71(2):235–259
Kitts JA (2008) Dynamics and stability of collective action norms. J Math Soc 32:142–163
Leonard J (2001) Doping in elite swimming: a case study of the modern era from 1970 forward. In:
Wilson W, Derse E (eds), Doping in elite sport: the politics of drugs in the Olympic movement.
Human Kinetics Publishers, Champaign, pp 225–239
Miller D, McFarland C (1987) Pluralistic ignorance: when similarity is interpreted as dissimilarity. J Per-
sonality Soc Psychol 53(2):298–305
Miller DT, Morrison KR (2009) Expressing deviant opinions: believing you are in the majority helps.
J Exp Soc Psych 45(4):740–747
North DC (1986) The new institutional economics. J Inst Theor Econ 142:230–237
O’Gorman HJ (1986) The discovery of pluralistic ignorance: an ironic lesson. J Hist Behav Sci 22(4):333–
347
Popitz H (1968) Über die Präventivwirkung des Nichtwissens: Dunkelziffer, Norm und Strafe. Mohr,
Tübingen
Rauhut H (2009a) Higher punishment, less control? Experimental evidence on the inspection game. Ration
Soc 21(3):359–392
Rauhut H (2009b) Stronger incentives for control reduce crime. A lab experiment on paradoxical effects
of incentives and a game theoretical explanation. Mimeo ETH, Zürich
Rauhut H, Junker M (2009) Punishment deters crime because humans are bounded in their strategic
decision-making. J Artif Soc Syst Soc 12(3)
Rauhut H, Krumpal I (2008) Die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen in Low-Cost und High-Cost Situationen.
Z Soziol 5:380–402
Tsebelis G (1989) The abuse of probability in political analysis: the Robinson Crusoe fallacy. Am Polit
Sci Rev 1:77–91
Tsebelis G (1990) Penalty has no impact on crime. A game theoretic analysis. Ration Soc 2:255–286
Willer R, Kuwabara K, Macy MW (2009) The false enforcement of unpopular norms’. Am J Sociol
115(2):451–490
Patrick Groeber is currently a Ph.D. student at the ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design. In his thesis,
he investigates the emergence and enforcement of social norms and conventions by means of mathematical
modeling, computer simulations and laboratory experiments. He earned a master degree in mathematics
from the University of Bremen.
Heiko Rauhut is a Post-Doc researcher at the ETH Zurich, Chair of Sociology, in particular of Modeling
and Simulation. His general interest concerns how social norms shape our lives. He is employing quantita-
tive methodologies, such as laboratory experiments, survey data and agent based models for understanding
of how social norms promote coordination and cooperation on the one hand, but conflict and collapse of
social order on the other. Moreover, his interests expand to methodological questions such as quantitative
social research methods, rational choice theory and empirical tests of game theoretical models. His current
peer-reviewed publications deal with the enforcement of social norms (Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 2008),
the strategic interaction between norm targets and norm guardians (Rationality and Society, 2009), and
with learning dynamics in normative behavior (Journal of Artificial Social Systems and Societies, 2009).
He is currently working on a book entitled ‘Crime and Punishment from a Game Theoretical Perspective’.
